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Abstract 
We set up a model which captures the spatial dimension of international fisheries in legal 
(i.e. internationally accessible high seas versus state-owned exclusive economic zones) 
and biological (i.e. various intensities of fish migration between zones) terms. We 
compare the success of regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs) for 
consistent and various forms of inconsistent management options, related to limitations of 
scope and compatibility of measures. While the performance of an RFMO declines in the 
presence of inconsistent management, participation might improve as free-riding 
becomes less attractive and the overall net effect may well be positive. This suggests to 
first broaden participation before deepening fishery treaties. 
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1. Introduction 
Managing global and international commons requires voluntary international cooperation 
due to the absence of a supranational institution that could enforce a cooperative 
management strategy. While, in general, a tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, 
internationally shared fish resources seem to be particularly vulnerable to 
overexploitation.1 In an attempt to address this problem, state-owned property rights have 
been established under the legal regime of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS; see UN 1982). According to Articles 56 and 57 of the Convention, 
every coastal state has the right to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), adjacent 
to its territorial waters, extending 200 nautical miles into the sea, in which it exercises 
sovereign rights regarding the management of all (living and non-living) marine 
resources. Beyond the EEZs, in the high seas, the open access regime persists, i.e. 
resources are subject to the exploitation by all nations (Art. 87). 
Despite this large-scale allocation of property rights, many commercially valuable fish 
stocks are still exploited (and overexploited) by more than one fishing nation because 
they either occur in the high seas and/or migrate through more than one jurisdictional 
area.2 Addressing this problem requires a comprehensive and consistent international 
management of shared fish stocks. International marine law recognizes this need for 
international coordination and cooperation. Art. 63 and Art. 64 of the UNCLOS call for a 
cooperative management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, either directly 
through bilateral negotiations or through the development of regional fisheries 
management organizations (RFMOs). This call for cooperation is repeated by the UN 
                                                 
1 For a documentation of the state of internationally shared fish resources, see Maguire et al. (2006). 
2  The common classification of shared fish stocks (cf. Munro et al. 2004, p. 3) is as follows: 
transboundary stocks inhabit (or cross) the EEZs of two or more coastal states, highly migratory 
stocks are to be found both within the EEZs and the adjacent high seas and are highly migratory in 
nature, straddling stocks also cover both EEZs and the high seas but are more stationary, discrete high 
seas stocks occur only in the high seas. 
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Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 (UN 1995) which deals explicitly with the conservation 
and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.3 
While there is a broad consensus in the international community that the management of 
shared fish stocks requires a cooperative approach, the details have been controversial 
during the negotiations preceding many fishery agreements. The undisputed sovereignty 
of coastal states with respect to the management of intra-EEZ resources obviously 
conflicts with the aim of a consistent management of shared fish stocks across the entire 
geographical area of their occurrence. The UNCLOS in 1982 calls for cooperation “both 
within and beyond the exclusive economic zone” (Art. 64 (1)) in the case of highly 
migratory species, whereas for straddling stocks Art. 63(2) only requires a cooperative 
management in the high seas. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 restates this 
distinction (Art. 7(1)) and emphasizes both the sovereignty of coastal states regarding 
intra-EEZ fishery management but also the importance of the compatibility of 
conservation measures at the same time (Art. 7(2)). Accordingly, most currently existing 
RFMOs confine the area of actual management to the high seas, but call for a 
compatibility of intra-EEZ and high seas management measures, though they remain 
vague how this compatibility shall be achieved.4  
                                                 
3 Highly migratory species are listed in Annex I of the UNCLOS and include most tuna species, as well 
as marlins and swordfish. Examples of straddling stocks include for instance the commercially 
valuable stocks of the Alaskan Pollock and the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring. 
4  The ambiguity inherent in Art. 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 leaves room for several 
interpretations. While Oude Elferink (2001) argues that it should be interpreted as favouring neither 
coastal states nor RFMO management authorities, Molenaar (2005) clearly supports the position of 
many coastal states which claim priority and sovereignty for coastal fisheries management. The latter 
position is sometimes referred to as the bottom-up approach, in contrast to a top-down approach 
which gives priority to RFMO management (Örebech et al. 1998). Based on an analysis of the 
aforementioned Art. 7, Goltz (1995) concludes that priority will depend on the specific 
circumstances. In order to avoid conflicts, some RFMOs simply ignore this issue. For instance, a 
recent performance review criticized that the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) „has not taken any measure aimed at ensuring the compatibility between 
conservation and management measures adopted by a coastal State with respect to the areas under 
its jurisdiction and those adopted by ICCAT” (Hurry et al. 2008, p. 16).  
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A good representative example is the herring in the North East Atlantic which is shared 
by Norway, Iceland, the Russian Federation, the European Union, the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, accounting for an annual catch of more than 1.6 million tons in 2009. The 
RFMO in charge of managing this stock, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC), states the ”long-term conservation and optimum utilization of the fishery 
resources in the Convention Area” (Art. 2 NEAFC Convention) as its objective. Although 
the Convention Area comprises both areas within and beyond areas under national 
jurisdiction, NEAFC’s regulatory power is limited to the high seas in recognition of the 
sovereign rights of coastal states within EEZ boundaries (Art. 5(1)).5 A consistent 
management is defined as one that respects the management measures adopted by coastal 
states within the areas under their national jurisdiction (Art. 5(2)). Similarly vague and 
contradictory provisions are part of the conventions of many RFMOs, creating a constant 
source of conflict between RFMO member states. For example, a recent performance 
review of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) criticized that “the language 
used [in the NAFO Convention] does not create an obligation on either the [NAFO] 
Commission or coastal State to ensure consistency in their measures” (NAFO 2011, p. 
22). Consequently, conflicts arise such as in 1999, when the EU accused Canada for 
intra-EEZ cod fishing being not being compatible with conservation efforts established 
by NAFO (Oude Elferink 2001). 
Obviously, a single decision maker aiming at maximizing global welfare would 
implement a consistent management of fishing resources across all zones, being aware of 
migration patterns. Technically speaking, he would maximize the aggregate economic 
rent from fishing in all zones, taking into account linkages across zones through 
migration. However, in reality, there is no single decision maker, participation in an 
RFMO has to be voluntary and hence participation is often incomplete due to free-riding 
and the members of an RFMO may depart from the implementation of a consistent 
                                                 
5  Regarding fishing in the EEZ of a member state, the NEAFC Commission has only limited influence. 
First, it can only make recommendations if the coastal state in question requests this. Second the 
coastal state has to approve the recommendations in order for them to become effective (Art. 6(1)).  
4 
fishery management. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate the success of RFMOs in such 
a strategic setting and under the restriction that RFMOs have to be self-enforcing. In 
particular, we are interested in comparing the performance of RFMOs with consistent to 
those with inconsistent management strategies.  
In a strategic setting the outcome of such a comparison is not obvious for at least two 
reasons. First, due to strategic interaction between fishing nations, either as an RFMO 
member or non-member, what is optimal at the individual level does not necessarily have 
to be optimal at the aggregate level and vice versa.6 Second, even if a departure from a 
first-best management strategy negatively impacts on economic rents, this may be 
compensated by higher participation in an RFMO.7 A less ambitious management 
strategy may buy more participation which may improve the overall performance of an 
RFMO. Whereas it is straightforward to define consistent management, the possibilities 
of second-best designs are numerous. In order to test the robustness of our conclusions, 
we will consider two versions of inconsistent management strategies related to the scope 
of cooperation and the compatibility of measures.  
The issue at stake requires an approach that captures two essential features of 
international fisheries simultaneously. First, we have to set up a bioeconomic model 
which captures different geographical areas (high seas and EEZs) and the migration of 
fish stocks across zones. Second, we require a coalition formation model which tests for 
stability of RFMOs. In the literature on fishery economics such an integrated approach is 
missing so far. The first aspect is dealt with in several papers considering the exploitation 
                                                 
6 For instance, in the context of climate change, uncertainty and learning, Kolstad (2007), Finus and 
Pintassilgo (2012) and Na and Shin (1998) show that no learning may lead to better global outcomes 
than learning due to strategic interaction across players. 
7 In the context of global emissions, such countervailing effects have been described by Barrett (2002) 
(“consensus versus focal treaty”) and Finus and Rundshagen (1998) (“majority versus unanimity 
voting”) in a repeated game framework and by Finus and Maus (2008), who call it “modesty versus 
ambition” in a coalition formation model of the type we use in this paper. See also more recently 
Courtois and Haeringer (2012) on the trade-off between environmental treaty objectives and 
participation. 
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of a migratory fish stock by two or more competing fishing nations (e.g. McKelvey et al. 
2002, Hannesson 1997, Naito and Polasky 1997, and Arnason et al. 2000). These papers 
typically consider the Nash equilibrium outcome in a competitive game and demonstrate 
its inefficiency by contrasting it with the outcome of a fully cooperative management 
scheme. They do not, however, examine the stability and success of coalitions, and if so, 
they only test for stability of the grand coalition but not of partially cooperative 
agreements. Also on the second aspect there exists an extensive literature on international 
fishery coalitions which can be broadly divided into two categories (for an overview, see 
Lindroos et al. 2007). Most of the early papers apply cooperative game theory to examine 
the implications of various sharing rules such as the Shapley value under full cooperation 
(e.g. Kaitala and Lindroos 1998 and Duarte et al. 2000). This approach, however, does 
not allow studying the impact of free-riding explicitly. This requires concepts from non-
cooperative coalition theory, first applied by Pintassilgo (2003) to the analysis of 
international fisheries. In a similar paper, Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) conclude that 
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is the only stable outcome whenever the number of 
fishing nations exceeds two. However, these papers confine their analysis to one zone; 
hence migration does not matter. Our work extends Finus et al. (2011), who incorporate 
different geographical zones and migration into the analysis of international fishery 
coalitions, by including suboptimal management strategies. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bioeconomic model, which is 
an extension of the Gordon-Schaefer model accounting for different geographical zones 
and migration. Section 3 deals with the economic behavior of countries. It introduces the 
coalition formation model and the various scenarios of consistent and inconsistent fishery 
management strategies. Section 4 details our solving procedure and outlines the model 
and parameter specifications. Sections 5 and 6 discuss our results and section 7 
concludes.  
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2. The Model 
2.1 Preliminaries 
The analysis of cooperation in international fisheries requires concepts from biology in 
order to describe the biological processes of the fish stock (e.g. growth and migration 
patterns), has to take into account the legal framework of international marine law, and 
should capture the essential features of economic behavior of the protagonists in the 
“fishery game”. The biological part is based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer model 
(Gordon 1954 and Schaefer 1954) which has been frequently used to analyze the steady-
state of an exploited (fish) resource (for an introduction, cf. Clark 2005). The economic 
and behavioral part is based on the single coalition open membership game due to 
d’Aspremont et al. (1983) which has been frequently applied in the literature on 
international environmental agreements (e.g. Carraro 2000 and Finus 2003, 2008 for 
surveys).  
2.2 The Biological and Spatial Dimension  
We assume that a given number of fishing nations N  exploit a shared fishery resource 
which is characterized by an intrinsic reproduction process. The steady state of the fish 
stock in the classical Gordon-Schaefer-model is described by the following equation:  
   dX G X H X , 0
dt
  E  .               (1) 
Eq. (1) states that in the steady-state, growth G  and harvest H  are balanced such that the 
stock X  remains constant over time. For intrinsic growth it is usually assumed that 
growth requires an initial population   G X 0 0  , it is positive as long as the carrying 
capacity k  has not been reached   G 0 X k 0    and it stops at the carrying capacity 
k  of the system   G X k 0  . Total harvest depends on the stock X  and the vector of 
individual fishing efforts  1 NE ,...,EE .  
In order to capture the fact that the traditional open access and laissez-faire regime has 
been replaced by the legal framework defined by the UNCLOS in 1982, we have to 
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extend the classical model by partitioning the sea into various zones: the high seas, i.e. 
the common property where all nations can fish, abbreviated HS , and the exclusive 
economic zones, the state-owned zones where only coastal state i  is allowed to fish, 
abbreviated iEEZ . We denote the entire size of the system by totk , assuming that a share 
  of the habitat of the resource is subject to access by all fishing nations and define: 
HS totk k  and EEZ tot1k kN
                 (2) 
Hence, in our context, players are sovereign countries engaging in fishing, i.e. coastal 
states, each owning an EEZ with exclusive fishing rights, but they can also fish in the 
high seas. The vector of fish stocks,  1 N HSX ,...,X ,XX , describes the population in 
each zone. The modified steady-state condition (1) then reads:  
   d , D 0
dt
   X G X H X E X                (1’) 
where the term DX  accounts for the migration of fish stocks across zones with D  a 
diffusion matrix which is explained in more detail below. The components of the growth 
vector  1 N HS( G ,...,G ,G )G  describe intrinsic growth in each zone. Similarly, harvesting 
in each zone is defined by the harvest vector  EEZ ,1 EEZ ,N HS( H ,...,H ,H )H  which depends 
both on the vector of stocks, X , and the vector of efforts, 
 EEZ ,1 EEZ ,N HS ,1 HS ,NE ,...,E ,E ,...,EE . Note that each fishing nation i  has two strategic 
variables, its fishing effort in its own EEZ, EEZ ,iE , and the fishing effort in the high seas, 
HS ,iE . Due to the migratory behavior of fish stocks, harvest from each zone generally 
depends on all fishing efforts.  
2.3. The Economic Dimension 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Within the framework of international fisheries, each fishing nation has to decide whether 
to join an RFMO or not, and it has to choose the level of fishing effort for its fleet. 
Cooperation among a group of players corresponds to the establishment of an RFMO 
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with the purpose of managing and conserving the fish stocks jointly. Participation in an 
RFMO is open to all nations as reflected by Article 8(3) of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement in 1995. Moreover, states which decide against membership in an RFMO 
cannot be prevented from harvesting. 
In order to capture exactly these institutional features, we choose from the set of coalition 
formation games the single coalition open membership game which is a two-stage game. 
In the first stage, players decide upon their membership. Those players that join the 
RFMO form the coalition and are called members or signatories; those that do not join 
are called non-members or non-signatories and act as singletons. The decisions in the first 
stage lead to a coalition structure  (N-n)K S , 1 , where S  is the set of n  coalition 
members, and (N-n)1  is the vector of N n  singletons. Given the simple structure of the 
first stage, a coalition structure is fully characterized by coalition S .  
In the second stage, players choose their economic strategies which are fishing efforts in 
our bioeconomic model. The standard assumption is that the coalition members cooperate 
among each other, maximizing the aggregate payoff to the coalition whereas all non-
members maximize their individual payoffs. The simultaneous solution of these 
maximization tasks leads to an equilibrium vector of fishing efforts 
 * * * * *EEZ ,1 EEZ ,N HS ,1 HS ,NE ,...,E ,E ,...,EE  and individual economic payoffs 
* * *
i EEZ ,i HS ,i     from fishing in the own EEZ and the high seas, respectively: 
     Π EEZ ,iEEZ ,* * * *EEZ ,i i ipH , C E E X E  and      Π HS , iHS ,i* * * *H ,i iS pH , C E E X E  (3) 
where p is the (exogenously) given fish price and   iC   denotes player i ’s cost function. 
Note that all stocks and therefore payoffs depend on the entire vector of fishing efforts 
due to the process of migration that links the various fishing grounds. For notational 
convenience, we will omit the arguments in the payoff functions subsequently.  
In the following, we have a closer look at the two-stage game which is solved backward. 
Our main focus in this paper and the departure from the standard assumption is related to 
the second stage where we distinguish between consistent and two versions of 
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inconsistent fishery management. However, because second stage outcomes affect 
equilibrium payoffs, this will also affect the choice of membership in the first stage. 
2.3.2 Second Stage of the Game: the Choice of Fishing Efforts 
Consistent Management 
A consistent management requires that each player, including the coalition with 
signatories as a kind of meta-player (Haeringer 2004) as well as all non-signatories as 
singletons, maximize an objective function comprising payoffs obtained from fishing in 
the high seas and from the exclusive economic zones. 
Non-signatories:  
, ,
, ,( , )
max
EEZ j HS j
EEZ j HS jE E
j S                 (4) 
Signatories:  
, ,
, ,( , )
max
EEZ i HS i
EEZ i HS i
i SEE
i S

                  (5) 
The difference between signatories and signatories is that the former maximize their 
individual payoff whereas the latter maximize the aggregate payoff across all coalition 
members. Hence, equilibrium fishing efforts, as derived from (4) and (5), form a Nash 
equilibrium in a game between outsiders and the coalition. This is sometimes called a 
coalitional Nash equilibrium in order to distinguish it from an ordinary Nash equilibrium 
with which it coincides if coalition S  is empty or comprises only one player. Moreover, 
if coalition S  comprises all players,  1S ,...,N , the coalitional Nash equilibrium 
corresponds to the socially optimal fishing vector. Hence, the entire range from no 
cooperation, partial cooperation to full cooperation can be captured with this approach.  
Consistent, in contrast to inconsistent management, means in particular two things. In 
terms of the scope of cooperation, the coalition extends cooperation beyond the high seas 
and includes the EEZs. De facto, this implies that coalition members fully concede their 
sovereignty to the governing body of the RFMO. In terms of the compatibility of 
measures, all players fully realize the interaction between fishing efforts in the high seas 
and the exclusive economic zones and vice versa.  
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While there is only one way of defining consistent management, there are various 
possibilities of a departure from first-best. Based on an analysis of international fisheries 
agreements (e.g. NAFO 2004, NEAFC 2007 and ICCAT 2007) and secondary literature 
on international marine law (e.g. Oude Elferink 2001 and Molenaar 2005), we consider 
two scenarios as particularly relevant in practice (see also the discussion in the 
Introduction). Clearly, formalizing this in a model implies a stylized representation of 
inconsistent behavior. 
Inconsistent Management – Restricted Scope of Cooperation 
As pointed out by Molenaar (2005) and Oude Elferink (2001), many coastal states are 
unwilling to give up their national sovereignty with respect to intra-EEZ fishery 
management. Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, the sovereignty of coastal 
states is commonly recognized as undisputable and the legal framework in international 
fisheries is not always clear about the scope of cooperation required in RFMOs. In order 
to capture the possibility of a restricted scope of cooperation in a systematic and simple 
way, we replace conditions (4) and (5) by the following three conditions: 
Non-signatories:  , , , ,,maxEEZ j HS j EEZ j HS jE E j S                 (6) 
    
,
, , , ,
,
max
EEZ i
EEZ i HS i EEZ k HS kE k S k i
i S
 
                 (7) 
Signatories: 
   
,
, ,max
HS i
EEZ i HS iE i S
i S

                   (8) 
where [0,1]   denotes the scope parameter. The first condition describes non-
signatories' non-cooperative behavior, which is unaffected by the scope of cooperation. 
Accordingly, conditions (4) and (6) are identical. In contrast, condition (7) captures the 
idea that the decision about intra-EEZ fishing remains with the coastal state even if a 
country decides to become a member of an RFMO. A coalition member may not take full 
account of the impacts on the stocks in the high seas and the EEZs of other coalition 
members when choosing its fishing effort in its EEZ. Specifically, a coalition member, 
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when choosing fishing efforts in his own EEZ, maximizes his individual payoff, which is 
the sum of the payoff from his own EEZ, ,EEZ i , and from the high seas, ,HS i , plus a 
share   of the payoffs of the other coalition members, which is the last sum. Hence,   
describes the scope of cooperation. One interpretation is that   captures the extent by 
which a signatory takes into account the payoffs of his coalition partners when choosing 
fishing efforts in his own EEZs. Another interpretation is that   captures the extent by 
which the RFMO can control fishing in the EEZs. Condition (8) reflects the assumption 
that the coalition decides upon the fishing efforts in the high seas.  
If 0  , signatories are completely self-interested and/or the RFMO has no control over 
fishing in the EEZ of its members. At the other extreme, 1   implies full scope of 
cooperation and accordingly, condition (7) and (8) merge into condition (5). It is 
important to note that a restricted scope of cooperation does not mean incompatibility of 
measures as assumed in our next scenario. In (7) RFMO members behave fully rationally 
in their EEZs as they are aware that fishing in their own EEZ will affect their payoff 
derived from the high seas and in (8) they understand that fishing in the high seas will 
impact on their EEZ stocks (and hence payoffs).  
Inconsistent Management – The Incompatibility of Measures 
The second scenario captures the idea of incompatibility of measures. This acknowledges 
the fact that though compatibility of measures is called for in many international fisheries 
agreements (e.g. in Art. 7 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement), it is usually 
insufficiently implemented, especially if a fishing nation puts the management of intra-
EEZ and high seas fisheries under the control of different national authorities (see 
Arbuckle et al. 2006, p. 36). A simple way of modeling this is to assume that the coalition 
as well as non-signatories only partially account for their payoffs from the high seas 
when determining optimal fishing efforts in the EEZs and vice versa: 
   
,
, ,max
EEZ j
EEZ j HS jE
j S                 (9) 
Non-signatories: 
   
,
, ,max
HS j
HS j EEZ jE
j S                (10) 
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,
,,max
EEZ i
EEZ iE i S
HS i
i S
i S

               (11) 
Signatories: 
,
,,max
HS i
HS i
i S
EEZ iE i S
i S

              (12) 
The compatibility parameter [0,1]   describes the degree of compatibility of measures. 
Condition (9) and (10) define the maximization behavior of non-signatories whereas 
condition (11) and (12) refer to the behavior of coalition members. If 0  , players fully 
ignore the need for compatible measures. At the other extreme, 1   corresponds to fully 
compatible measures, i.e. conditions (9) to (12) collapse into conditions (4) and (5), our 
consistent scenario. Non-signatories are assumed to implement always the same degree of 
compatibility as signatories for simplicity.  
Computations 
Viewed together, regardless whether we consider a consistent or one of the inconsistent 
management scenarios in the second stage, the solution of the respective first order 
conditions (together with the steady-state conditions eq. (1’) of the biological 
equilibrium) leads to an equilibrium vector of fishing efforts which allows to determine 
steady-state stocks (eq. (1’)) and equilibrium payoffs (eq. (3)).8 Each scenario can be 
viewed as a clear instruction how to choose fishing efforts in the second stage, given 
some coalition S  has formed in the first stage. Hence, in order to simplify the following 
notation, we can replace * * * * * *i EEZ ,i HS ,i( E ) ( E ) ( E )     by * *i EEZ ,i( S ) ( S )    
*
HS ,i ( S )  or simply *i ( S ) . 
3.3 First Stage of the Game: Membership Decisions 
For the first stage, we use the equilibrium concept of internal and external stability, i.e. a 
coalition S  is considered to be stable if it fulfills the following two conditions:  
                                                 
8  This implies to compute ex-post payoffs. This keeps with the tradition of other papers modelling 
different economic behaviour through different objective functions, but using the “true” welfare 
function for evaluation. See for instance Finus and Maus (2008) and Hoel (1991). 
13 
Internal Stability  
No member i S  finds it profitable to deviate, i.e. the gain iG  from leaving the coalition 
is non-positive: * *i i iG : ( S \{ i }) ( S ) 0     i S  . 
External Stability  
No non-member j S  finds it profitable to join the coalition, i.e. the gain jQ  from 
joining the coalition is non-positive: 0* *j j jQ : ( S { j }) ( S )      j S  .  
Note that the incentives iG  and jQ  depend on the coalition structure, the scope and 
compatibility parameters   and   as well as other parameters of the model (see 
subsection 4.1). The grand coalition is externally stable by definition as there is no 
outsider left that could join the coalition. Moreover, the coalition structure comprising 
only singletons is stable by definition, which ensures existence of a stable coalition 
structure. This follows from the fact that the singleton coalition structure can be 
supported as an equilibrium if all players announce not to be a member of the coalition, 
i.e. S  , and hence a single deviation by one player will make no difference.  
4. Solving Procedure and Model Specifications 
4.1 Preliminaries 
In general, solving the second stage of the game requires solving a system of 3 1N   
equations ( 2N economic FOCs and 1N   biological steady-state equations) for N  
optimal intra-EEZ efforts ,EEZ iE , N  optimal high seas efforts ,HS iE  and 1N   steady-
state stocks  1 N HSX ,...,X ,X . As optimal efforts in the second stage of the game depend 
on stock levels and vice versa, they all have to be determined simultaneously. Obviously, 
any solution will depend on the specification of the functional relationship between 
stocks, efforts and payoffs. That is, we have to specify growth, harvest and cost functions 
and define a dispersal matrix which describes the migration process. This is done in 
subsection 4.2. Due to migration, the model is significantly more complex than the 
standard Gordon-Schaefer model and cannot be solved analytically any more. Therefore 
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we have to rely on numerical simulations of which the underlying assumptions are 
described in subsection 4.3.  
4.2 Functional Specification 
The functional relationships underlying our model are summarized in Table 1. It will be 
apparent that the specifications follow the mainstream assumptions in the literature.  
[ Table 1 about here ] 
The most commonly used growth function (Table 1, first row) is of the logistic type 
where ir  denotes the intrinsic growth rate in zone i .  
Regarding the harvest function (Table 1, second row), we have to bear in mind that all 
countries are allowed to fish in the high seas whereas only the owner of an EEZ is 
allowed to fish in this territory. As commonly assumed, (total) harvest depends linearly 
on (total) fishing efforts and stock densities, with iq  denoting the catchability coefficient, 
a measure of the technical efficiency of the fishing fleet i .  
Two aspects need to be considered when specifying the migration process.9 First, the 
arrangement of zones has to be specified, i.e. which zones are connected through 
diffusion. We choose an intuitive and symmetric arrangement of the 1N   zones: the 
EEZs are arranged in a circle with the high seas at its center. This avoids boundary 
effects that would emerge with a linear arrangement and represents a good first-order 
approximation for the geographical setting of many examples where an area of high seas 
is surrounded by coastal zones. A perfect match of this assumption is for instance the 
‘Banana Hole’ in the Northeast Atlantic or the ‘Donut Hole’ in the Bering Sea (see 
Meltzer 1994).  
Second, we have to define what determines the intensity of migration between two 
neighboring fishing grounds. We assume a density-dependent diffusion process, i.e. the 
strength of migration between neighboring fishing grounds is given by the difference in 
                                                 
9  For an extensive discussion of our and alternative assumptions see Finus et al. (2011). 
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stock densities, scaled by the product of the sizes of zones (Kvamsdal and Groves 2008, 
Table 1, third row).10 This description of the diffusion process ensures the conservation 
of biomass in the absence of harvest and growth, i.e. whatever leaves zone i  for zone j  
arrives in zone j  without any losses. Furthermore, it reflects the assumption that the 
intensity and direction of dispersal only depends on the difference in stock densities 
between zones. The diffusion parameter ijd  is an indicator for the intensity of diffusion 
from zone i  to zone j . 
It is a common assumption in the literature on fishery management (Gordon 1954, Pezzey 
et al. 2000 and Sanchirico and Wilen 1999) that costs (Table 1, fourth row) depend 
linearly on extraction efforts, though they are strictly convex if expressed in terms of 
harvest levels where ic  is the (constant) marginal cost of fishing effort of the fishing fleet 
of country i . 
4.3 Simulations 
Simulations require the assumption of numerical values for the parameters of the model. 
Fortunately, a closer look at the system of equations reveals that results will depend on 
only few parameters. The choice of parameter values follows good practice, covering a 
large parameter space as summarized in Table II. 
[ Table II about here ] 
First, note that in order to save on computational time, we concentrate on the case of 
three players ( 3N  ), which, admittedly, is the minimum number of players to study 
coalition formation but, as we will see, is already sufficient to obtain interesting insights 
into the incentive structure of cooperative arrangements. For N 3 , we have to consider 
three possible coalition structures, namely the grand coalition, the two-player coalitions, 
and the all-singletons coalition structure. Furthermore, we restrict the analysis to 
symmetric parameter values, both with respect to the biological and economic 
                                                 
10   To see that the entries of the diffusion matrix (Table 1, third row) do indeed imply the described 
diffusion process, consider the entries of the vector DX , which is relevant in eq. (1’). 
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parameters.11 Consequently, all possible two-player coalitions are equivalent with 
symmetric payoffs for coalition members, though they differ from the payoff of a non-
member.  
Second, note that all subsequent results only depend on what is commonly referred to as 
the ‘inverse efficiency parameter’ 
tot
c
pqk  (see Mesterton-Gibbons 1993). Since the total 
carrying capacity totk  just represents a scaling factor, it is normalized to 4 as there are 
four zones with 3N   players.12 Moreover , we can normalize p  and q  to 1 and hence 
only vary c . Thus, a variation of the cost parameter c  is, ceteris paribus, de facto a 
variation of the relation c pq . Since prohibitive costs at which countries quit fishing are 
given by 1c  , irrespective of the scenario of cooperation, we have [0,1]c . In our 
simulations, we consider the three values, 0 25 0 5 0 75c { . , . , . } . For the intrinsic growth 
rate r , we also consider three values, 0 25 0 5 0 75r { . , . , . } , which includes the commonly 
used value 0 5r . .13  
For the diffusion parameter d  our simulations cover the range  0 maxd .. d  with the 
upper bound 1 28maxd .  that approximates well the limit d  .14 With respect to  , 
we cover the whole range [0,1]  , with 0   implying that the entire fishing area 
comprises only state-owned exclusive economic zones and 1   implying that the entire 
area comprises only the common property high seas. All results are tested in the entire 
interval in steps of 0 05.  . Note that the carrying capacities, EEZk  and HSk , follow 
                                                 
11  The assumption of symmetric players is widespread in the literature on coalition formation, not only 
on international environmental treaties but also in the context of other economic problems (see e.g. 
Bloch 2003, and Yi 2003 for an overview). This assumption allows us to focus on the main issues of 
the paper, namely the effect of the scope and compatibility of measures on the success of RFMOs. 
Note that for symmetric players it is natural to assume an equal sharing of the coalitional payoff. 
12  This is in line with the common normalization 1k   in articles that deal with only a single zone (e.g. 
Pezzey et al. 2000). In our model, assuming no diffusion between zones with 4totk   and setting 
0 25.   results in four isolated zones with carrying capacities 1k  . See equation (2). 
13  Our mean values, 0 5c .  and 0 5r . , are commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. Hannesson 
1997 and Tarui et al. 2008).  
14  Results for maxd d  differ less than 5 % from the results in the limit d  , which can be 
calculated analytically. 
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from the allocation parameter   and the total carrying capacity totk  (see section 2.2, 
equation (2)). Finally, the scope parameter 0 1[ , ]   as well as the compatibility 
parameter 0 1[ , ]   are analyzed in the entire range in steps of 0 2.  . 
Note finally that if not stated otherwise, all subsequent results hold for the entire 
parameter range outlined above and summarized in Table 2. 
5. Results: The Scope of Cooperation 
In this section, we discuss the impact of a restricted scope of cooperation, first with 
respect to the second stage of the game, i.e. fishing efforts, stocks and payoffs, then with 
respect to the first stage of the game, i.e. membership decisions. Finally, we pull both 
stages together. 
Second Stage of Coalition Formation 
In the second stage, equilibrium fishing efforts, stocks, and payoffs depend on the scope 
parameter   for every possible coalition structure.15 Recall that the scope parameter   
denotes the extent to which coalition members consider the payoffs of other coalition 
members when choosing their fishing efforts in their own EEZ, with the scope increasing 
from 0 to 1. Before turning to the results, it is worthwhile to point out those situations in 
which the scope of cooperation does not matter. These include the case ‘only high seas’ 
( 1  ) or ‘all zones are isolated’ ( 0d  ). In contrast, whenever 0 1   and 0d   
hold, the scope of cooperation matters. The only exception is the all-singletons coalition 
structure as no RFMO has formed. 
Result 1: The Scope of Cooperation and Equilibrium Efforts, Stocks and Payoffs. 
Assume 0 1   and 0d   and consider the two-player or grand coalition. 
a) Total fishing efforts decrease whereas total stocks and total payoffs increase in the 
scope parameter   where totals refer to the aggregation over all players and zones.  
                                                 
15  In the following, we omit the term ‘equilibrium’ for notational convenience. 
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b) The quantitative impact of a marginal variation of the scope parameter   on total 
efforts, stocks and payoffs increases in the diffusion parameter d .  
Result 1a conforms to intuition regarding the grand coalition. In the absence of strategic 
interaction, any restriction of the scope of cooperation reduces the biological 
effectiveness of a cooperative agreement (i.e. higher fishing efforts and hence lower 
stocks), and decreases payoffs. As   approaches 0, the outcome under the grand coalition 
approaches that under no cooperation. Less obvious is that this also holds under the two-
player coalition with strategic interaction between the coalition and the outsider. The 
reason is that the smaller the scope of cooperation (the smaller  ), the larger are 
coalitional fishing efforts which are only partially compensated by lower fishing efforts 
of the outsider. That is, though reaction functions are negatively sloped, slopes are less 
than 1 in absolute terms. Hence, conceding costal states sovereignty in intra-EEZ fishery 
management threatens the success of a given RFMO, leading to lower aggregate payoffs 
and higher stocks. In terms of aggregate payoffs, this is illustrated with an example in 
Table III. 
[ Table III about here ] 
Result 1b stresses the significance of diffusion. The negative impact of a restricted scope 
of cooperation, both in terms of the biological effectiveness and economic success of an 
RFMO, is more pronounced when stocks are highly mobile. Thus, the strong emphasis on 
a fully integrated fishery management in the particular case of highly migratory species, 
as expressed in the UNCLOS in 1982 and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995, is 
supported by our findings, at least as long as we abstract from the stability of agreements, 
related to the first stage of coalition formation, which we consider now. 
First Stage of Coalition Formation 
Now we investigate how the scope of cooperation affects the stability of coalitions. 
Before considering the impact of a restricted scope of cooperation  1  , let us briefly 
review the results under full scope of cooperation  1   as obtained in Finus et al. 
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(2011). In this case, the grand coalition is never stable except for the parameter 
combination 0   and 0d   where there are only EEZs and all zones are isolated. In 
this case, however, there is no externality across players and zones and hence cooperation 
does not matter: the second stage outcomes under all coalition structures coincide. Hence, 
RFMOs are not necessary. 
Regarding a two-player coalition, there is a small parameter range for which cooperation 
can be stable. Specifically, assuming all parameters at their base value ( 0.5c   and 
0.5r  ), the two-player coalition is unstable whenever 0 02.   or 0 32d . , but may be 
stable for smaller values. The intuition is that there are two countervailing forces at work. 
On the one hand, the stronger the externality across players and zones, i.e. the larger the 
proportion   of the common pool resource compared to the exclusively state-owned 
EEZs, and the larger diffusion d , the larger would be the gains from cooperation and 
hence the more valuable would be cooperation. On the other hand, with increasing   and 
d , also the incentive to free-ride sharply increases. Overall, the two-player coalition will 
only be stable if   and d  are sufficiently small. Considering a restricted scope of 
cooperation changes this result. 
Result 2: The Scope of Cooperation and the Stability of Coalitions 
The parameter space 0   and 0d   for which the grand coalition or the two-player 
coalition is stable can be enlarged by reducing the scope of cooperation, i.e. by departing 
from the value 1  . 
Result 2 is encouraging: in contrast to the negative consequences of a reduced scope of 
cooperation on second stage outcomes (e.g. measured in terms of stocks and payoffs), it 
can have a positive impact on first stage outcomes by helping to stabilize RFMOs. This is 
illustrated with our example in Table II. The largest stable coalition with full scope of 
cooperation ( 1  ) is a two-player coalition. Reducing   to at least 0.4   allows 
stabilizing also the grand coalition. 
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The intuition behind Result 2 is that countries are more willing to join an RFMO if they 
can keep full or partial national sovereignty over intra-EEZ fishery management. This 
enables them to derive a larger exclusive benefit in their EEZs from the conservation 
measures implemented by the RFMO in the high seas. In other words, within their EEZs 
coalition members are partially allowed to free-ride on the cooperative efforts of the 
RFMO in which they participate. Hence, we conclude that a departure from first-best – 
being less ambitious – may buy larger stable membership in RFMOs. 
Overall Result 
Second stage outcomes, Result 1, and first stage outcomes, Result 2, revealed two 
countervailing tendencies associated with a reduction in the scope of cooperation. Not 
surprisingly, combining both results only allows for a very general statement (Result 3), 
though the subsequent representative example and statistics are quite revealing. 
Result 3: The Scope of Cooperation and the Overall Success of Coalitions 
Restricting the scope of cooperation, i.e. departing from the value 1  , can be welfare-
improving. 
For instance, consider again the example in Table III. Without restriction of the scope of 
cooperation, 1  , the highest aggregate payoff of a stable coalition is generated by a 
two-player coalition (with a welfare level of 97.3%). For 1  , the grand coalition is not 
stable. Testing whether an improvement over this outcome is possible means to lower   
to a point which just allows stabilizing the grand coalition. In the example, this requires 
to lower   to a value of 0.4. For 0.4  , the grand coalition generates an aggregate 
welfare level of 98.3% and therefore constitutes an improvement over the two-player 
coalition. Obviously, lowering   further makes no sense as this increases the negative 
second stage effect which cannot be compensated by a positive first stage effect as the 
maximum membership has already been reached in this example.  
Other examples would confirm this relation which implies that global welfare is a step 
function. Reducing the scope of cooperation   gradually reduces global welfare until a 
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point may be reached where global welfare jumps up to a higher level due to larger stable 
membership.  
Hence, given the restriction that RFMOs have to be self-enforcing, in a strategic setting, 
restricting the scope of cooperation can be welfare improving. Clearly, there are cases 
where this is not possible, e.g. “unfavourable” parameter values, like large values of   
and d , where even with values of   below 1 no RFMO is stable. If we rule out these 
parameter values and consider 0.2   and 0.32d   (but consider the full range of all 
other parameters as stated in Table II), we find that in 15% of the cases a restricted scope 
leads to better outcomes than a full scope; if an improvement is possible, the “optimal 
scope” leads to the grand coalition in 92 % of the cases and to the two player coalition in 
8% of the cases, with an average optimal scope of 0.7  . Hence, we can conclude that a 
departure from first-best may well be rational, though the socially optimal welfare level 
can never be obtained which necessarily requires to set 1   and the inclusion of all 
players.  
6. Results: The Compatibility of Measures 
We now turn to the second scenario of inconsistent management which we have defined 
above as an incompatibility of measures. Again, we follow the sequence of backward 
induction. 
Second Stage of Coalition Formation 
First, note that for the two extreme assumptions 0   (only EEZs and no high seas) and 
for 1   (only high seas) the compatibility of measures is irrelevant for the second stage, 
irrespective of the coalition structure which has formed in the first stage. The same holds 
if all zones are isolated because there is no fish migration  0d  . In contrast, whenever 
there are two distinct legal regimes  0 1   and the stocks in the different zones are 
linked to each other via diffusion  0d  , the compatibility of measures matters, as 
described in Result 4.  
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Result 4: The Compatibility of Measures and Equilibrium Efforts, Stocks and 
Payoffs 
Assume 0 1   and 0d   and consider any possible coalition structure. 
a) Total fishing efforts decrease whereas total stocks and total payoffs increase in the 
compatibility parameter   where totals refer to aggregation over all players and 
zones.  
b) The quantitative impact of a marginal variation of the compatibility parameter   
increases in the diffusion parameter d . 
Result 4a stresses the biological and economic importance of the compatibility of intra-
EEZ and high seas fishery management, irrespective of the number of cooperating 
countries. As the compatibility parameter   affects both signatories’ and non-
signatories’ behavior, it also has an impact on the outcome under the all-singletons 
coalition structure. Neglecting the need for compatibility leads to a rise in aggregate 
fishing efforts, a decline in stocks and thereby decreasing aggregate payoffs. An example 
in Table IV illustrates this point for aggregate payoffs, assuming the base parameter 
values and 0.25  . 
[ Table IV about here ] 
Result 4b points to the fact that the compatibility of measures is more important in the 
case of highly migratory stocks (high value of d ) where fishing in one zone creates a 
stronger externality on stocks in neighboring zones than in the case of straddling stocks 
(low value of d ).  
First Stage of Coalition Formation 
Recall that the all-singletons coalition structure is stable by definition for all parameter 
values and that the grand coalition is only stable when cooperation does not matter 
( 0   and 0d  ) if there is full compatibility of measures, 1  . Hence, Result 5 
focuses on the more interesting cases when either 0   or 0d  . 
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Result 5: The Compatibility of Measures and the Stability of Coalitions 
a) The grand coalition is never stable whenever 0   or 0d  , irrespective of the 
compatibility parameter 0 1  . 
b) The parameter space ( 0   and 0d  ) for which the two-player coalition is stable 
is larger under a limited compatibility of measures, i.e. for 1  . 
Result 5 is very similar to Result 3: a departure from a first-best management strategy can 
help to stabilize larger coalitions. Now, however, compromising on the compatibility of 
measures does not allow stabilizing the grand coalition, as this was possible when 
restricting the scope of cooperation, but only allows to stabilize a two-player coalition at 
best. The parameter space for which the two-player coalition can be stabilized can be 
substantially increased through lowering the value of  . The representative example in 
Table IV illustrates this point. If   is lowered to 0.2   the two-player coalition will be 
stable.  
Overall Result 
We now pull the results from the first and second stage together. 
Result 6: The Compatibility of Measures and the Overall Success of Coalitions 
A limited compatibility of measures  1   may increase global welfare. 
In view of the numerous international fisheries conventions that emphasize the 
importance of the compatibility of measures, Result 6 suggests that conclusions may be 
different if we explicitly account for strategic aspects of free-riding. Again, to find the 
optimal departure from first-best, i.e. the value of   that maximizes global welfare, we 
have to realize that global welfare is a non-continuous step function of the parameter  . 
This is illustrated for the representative example in Table IV. Apparently, a high value of 
  leads to higher aggregated payoffs but may not allow to stabilize a non-trivial RFMO. 
The highest total payoff (86.4%), generated by a stable coalition of two players, occurs 
for 0.2   in this example which dominates the highest possible payoff of the all-
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singletons coalition structure (85%) which occurs for 1  . Hence, a limited 
compatibility of measures can be welfare-improving. Again, we test for the entire 
parameter range in Table I, except that we assume 0.2   and 0.32d  , and find that in 
49% of the cases a restricted compatibility (i.e. 1  ) can improve upon an unrestricted, 
and in these cases, the optimal    implies the two player coalition in 93% and the grand 
coalition in 7% of the cases with an average optimal degree of compatibility of 0.4  .   
7. Conclusion 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 emphasized 
the sovereignty of coastal states’ fisheries management within the substantially enlarged 
areas under national jurisdiction and, at the same time, called for cooperation of fishing 
nations in the high seas. However, many commercially valuable species are found both 
within and beyond EEZ boundaries. This raises the question how a consistent 
management of fish stocks can be ensured. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 and 
many current RFMOs address this issue by calling for the consistency of management 
measures implemented by coastal states and RFMO authorities. Moreover, ideally, 
coastal states should hand over their sovereignty to the RFMO authorities once they 
become members of an RFMO. However, as argued in the introduction, the current 
practice provides many examples of inconsistent management and the issue has remained 
largely unresolved. While several authors have discussed how full compatibility and 
scope of management could be implemented in detail (e.g. Oude Elferink 2001, Molenaar 
2005), it has been little understood so far how inconsistent management schemes affect 
the overall success of RFMOs if stability is a binding constraint. 
To this end, we have developed an integrated model for internationally shared fish 
resources that explicitly captures the spatial dimension and accounts for the migratory 
nature of many commercially important fish species. Our model accounts for the fact that 
coastal states have been granted exclusive sovereign rights over their exclusive economic 
zones under the UNCLOS in 1982, but the area outside their territory, the high seas, can 
be exploited by all fishing nations. 
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In a two-stage coalitional game where countries first decide upon their membership in an 
RFMO and then choose their fishing efforts, we have approached the issue along two 
avenues. The first scenario considered the scope of cooperation, allowing for the 
possibility that coalition members partially pursue their own interest when choosing 
fishing efforts in their own EEZs. Essentially, this means that RFMO members do not 
concede their full sovereignty to the governing body of the RFMO. Through a 
parameterization we have been able to cover the full spectrum between “full sovereignty 
lies with members” to “full sovereignty lies with the RFMO”. The second scenario 
analyzed the compatibility of measures. Again, a parameterization allowed gradually 
relaxing the assumption that players fully account for the negative impact of fishing in 
their EEZ on the payoffs they receive from the high seas and also vice versa. Both 
approaches imply a departure from first-best and capture the notion of various degrees of 
inconsistent management of fishery resources.  
Interestingly, the qualitative results of both “inconsistent” scenarios have been quite 
similar and hence our conclusions appear quite robust. For any given RFMO 
membership, inconsistency has a negative impact, either measured in biological terms 
(fish stocks) or economic terms (payoffs). However, inconsistency can also have a 
positive impact on membership in that it can “buy” additional membership. 
Inconsistency, i.e. second- or third-best designs of treaties, de facto means to put less 
pressure on RFMO members to reduce their fishing efforts in order to preserve fish 
stocks. In other words, less is required from governments when joining an RFMO, either 
in terms of giving up their sovereignty or in terms of choosing compatible and consistent 
management strategies, as an RFMO member, but also as an authority controlling fishing 
in several jurisdictions, including EEZs and the high seas. Those less ambitious 
objectives reduce the free-rider incentive, helping to establish larger stable participation 
in RFMOs. It has been shown that – at least in theory - an “optimal degree of 
inconsistency” can be determined for this trade-off between the level of ambition and 
participation, which maximizes global economic rents of stable RFMOs.  
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In the light of our result, many current suboptimal forms of fishery management may be 
less harmful than commonly perceived. Clearly, this does not question the normative 
benchmark of first-best fishery management, but only points to the fact that as long as 
free-riding cannot be effectively controlled by a global authority, a bird in hand may be 
more valuable than two in the bushes. This also suggests that in developing treaties, the 
main focus should be first on encouraging large participation and only later on deepening 
treaties in terms of their objectives.  
For future research several topics come to mind. Our assumption about the migration 
pattern covers a large group of fish species, but there remain some species which may be 
better captured by different assumptions, e.g. linear migration patterns. It would be 
interesting to find out whether our qualitative conclusions would carry over to such 
alternative assumptions. Furthermore, it would be interesting to test our theory with 
empirical data. For our model, this would require a quite detailed and comprehensive data 
set, rarely available on international fisheries. Also the prospects of marine protected 
areas (i.e. nature reserve with no or restricted fishing, like analyzed in Punt et al. 2012) in 
the light of migration could be evaluated. Finally, a more sophisticated bargaining 
protocol as for instance suggested in Caparrós et al. (2004) could be employed. 
i 
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Table I: Functional Specification of Model 
1) Growth 
Functions 
  ii i i i
EEZ
XG X r X 1 , i 1,...,N
k
     
;   HSHS HS HS HS
HS
XG X r X 1
k
    
 
2) Harvest 
Functions  
  iEEZ ,i i i EEZ ,i
EEZ
XH X q E , i 1,...,N
k
  ;   N HSHS HS i HS ,i
i 1 HS
XH X q E
k
  
3) Migration 
Process 
Entries of the dispersal matrix D:
if i adjacent to j
otherwise
i j
ij
ii ji
j i
k k
d i j
d d i
d /
0


  
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4) Cost Functions i EEZ ,i i EEZ ,iC , i 1( E ) c ,. ,NE ..  ; i HS ,i i HS ,iC , i( E ) c E 1,...,N  
ir , HSr  = intrinsic growth rate in region i  and HS , respect.; iX , HSX  = stock in iEEZ  
and HS , respect.; EEZk , HSk  = carrying capacity in EEZ  and HS , respect.; iq  = efficiency 
parameter of country i ; EEZ ,iE , HS ,iE  = efforts in iEEZ  and HS , respect.; ijd  = diffusion 
parameter between region i   and j ; ic  = cost parameter of country i  . 
 
 
Table II: Parameter Values in Simulation Runs* 
Simulation Runs i jc c c   i jr r r   d        
Scope 0.25-0.75 0.25-0.75 0-1.28 0-1.0 0-1.0 - 
Compatibility 0.25-0.75 0.25-0.75 0-1.28 0-1.0 - 0-1.0 
* 1p  , 1q   and totk 4  are assumed throughout. 
vii 
Table III: The Scope of Cooperation: Aggregated Payoffs* 
Coalition 
Structure 
1   0.8   0.6   0.4   0.2   0   
No 
Cooperation 94.2 94.2 94.2 94.2 94.2 94.2 
Two-Player 
Coalition 97.3 96.9 96.5 95.9 95.1 94.2 
Grand 
Coalition 100 99.8 99.3 98.3 96.7 94.2 
* Total payoff (expressed as a percentage of total payoff in the social optimum) for various 
coalition structures and values of the scope parameter  . Total payoffs of stable coalition 
structures are bold. Note that whenever the grand coalition is unstable, this is due to 
failing internal stability whereas the two-player coalition is unstable for 0 4.   and 
0 2.   due to failing external stability. The following parameter values are assumed: 
0 16d . , 0 5c . , 0 5r . , 1p  , 1q   and 4totk   as well as 0  . 
 
Table IV: The Compatibility of Measures: Aggregated Payoffs* 
Coalition 
Structure 1   0.8   0.6  0.4  0.2  0   
No 
cooperation 85.0 83.3 81.5 79.5 77.4 75.1 
Two-Player 
Coalition 93.3 91.9 90.2 88.4 86.4 84.1 
Grand 
Coalition 100 99.9 99.5 98.9 97.9 96.6 
* Aggregated payoffs (expressed as a percentage of aggregated payoffs in the social 
optimum) for various coalition structures and values of the compatibility parameter  . 
Aggregated payoffs for stable coalition structures are in bold. The following parameter 
values are assumed: 0 16d . , 0 5c . , 0 5r . , 1p  , 1q   and 4totk   as well as 
0 25.  . 
